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A weak version of the Porter hypothesis claims that strict environmental policy provides positive 
innovation incentives, hence triggering improved competitiveness and securing environmental 
quality. In a comparative way, this paper empirically tests this hypothesis across countries by 
linking environmental stringency to innovation – proxied by patents – in the field of SO2 
abatement over the period 1970-2000. Three different models of environmental stringency are 
examined. Two of these models do not reveal a positive significant effect on innovation as a 
result of increased stringency. In the theoretically preferred model, however, a positive 
relationship between environmental stringency and innovation is obtained. 
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One of the salient features of the world economy is the increased tendency of 
liberalization and deregulation of markets, both at the national and the international level. 
Concurrently, the issue of sustainability comes to the fore more prominently. Several 
important questions arise in this respect. A first question is whether these developments 
are in conflict with each other. One can argue that an increase in international trade will 
lead to more pollution and an increased exploitation of natural resources, which is at 
variance with sustainable development. A counterargument would be that trade increases 
income, which may lead to more care for the environment.1 A second question, to which 
the present paper is related, refers to the link between environmental policy and 
international trade. 
There are two opposing views on this relationship. One view is that environmental 
regulation raises the costs to firms, hence affecting competitiveness adversely. In the 
absence of trade policy options, a “too” lax environmental policy might be used for 
strategic reasons. In this respect one can see environmental policy as a substitute for trade 
policy (see e.g., Elbers and Withagen (2003) for an assessment of ecological dumping). In 
the other view, prominently expressed by Porter (1991) and Porter and Van der Linde 
(1995a, 1995b), appropriate environmental regulation enhances innovation as well as 
efficiency by firms, thereby improving their competitiveness. The two views have been 
subject to fierce debates; theoretical as well as empirical research projects have dealt with 
the issue (e.g., Kalt, 1988; Tobey, 1990; Jaffe et al., 1995; Palmer et al., 1995; 
Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw, 1999; Mohr, 2002; Mulatu, 2004). However, systematic 
empirical tests of the Porter hypothesis are still very scarce. The aim of this paper is to 
reduce this gap in a cross-country setting. 
The central question concerns the relationship between the strictness of 
environmental policy and the level of innovativeness of firms that are subject to it. To 
address this question properly, one needs to define and operationalize the concepts of 
environmental stringency and innovativeness. On an aggregate level, a commonly used 
indicator for innovation is R&D expenditures. However, R&D expenditure data comprise 
inputs in the innovation process rather than successful outputs. In addition, R&D 
expenditures are not comprehensively available, because they mostly come from a subset 
of larger firms. Moreover, the data are inaccurate since the available data are not broken 
                                                 
1 See Copeland and Taylor (2003) for an excellent review of the debate. 
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down by technology group (Lanjouw et al., 1998). For these reasons, R&D expenditure 
data are not well suited for a cross-country analysis with an explicit focus on specific 
pollution abatement technologies. 
Another way of measuring innovative output is by means of the number of patent 
applications. Although not all patents will lead to innovation in practice and innovation 
does not yield a competitive edge per se, in a comparative way patents still provide 
information on innovative activities undertaken. Moreover, “it is the unique combination 
of detail and coverage found in patent data which make them particularly well-suited to 
studies of the efficacy of policies tailored to particular technological areas…” (Lanjouw et 
al., 1998, p. 406). This is exactly what the current study is covering, i.e., the impact of 
environmental policy on differential inventiveness in pollution control, in particular sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) abatement. 
In an extensive survey, Griliches (1990, p. 1661) mentions at least three advantages 
of patent statistics. First, patents statistics are available. This feature is particularly 
attractive in the light of the aforementioned inadequacy of R&D expenditure data for 
investigating differential inventiveness in international settings, i.e., across countries. 
Second, patents are by definition related to inventiveness. Third, they are based on an 
objective and slowly changing standard, because they are granted on the basis of novelty 
and utility. 
However, there are also problems associated with the use of patents for economic 
analyses. Two major problems are: classification and intrinsic variability (Griliches, 
1990). Classification refers to the problem of how to allocate patent data into 
economically relevant industry or product groupings. Intrinsic variability refers to the 
technical and economic value of patents. Some patents are highly valuable, whereas others 
are of minor value only.2 In this respect, patents are “indicators of success of the 
underlying inventive activity or R&D program” (Griliches, 1990, p. 1679). Since we are 
primarily interested in the degree of innovation induced by environmental policy, intrinsic 
variability is not so important for our study. Further, due to the high aggregation level of 
the current study, classification does not pose a problem either; it would have become a 
problem as soon as different industries within countries were considered. In Section 3 we 
outline more precisely how we dealt with it. 
There is abundant evidence showing that the diffusion of environmental innovations 
has increased considerably over the past decades; also the share of environmental patents 
                                                 
2 See Lanjouw et al. (1998) for a method to explore patent renewal data in order to capture the economic 
value of patents. 
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has increased as a percentage of total patents (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996). However, the 
time patterns differ among countries. An analysis linking stringency of environmental 
policy and patents might be one possible explanation for these patterns. 
In the present paper we focus on a case study for SO2 abatement. We provide a 
systematic analysis of the environmental policy effects on innovation related to SO2 
abatement. Since the vast majority of the literature on this issue solely focuses on the 
U.S.,3 we conduct a thorough investigation of patents over the period 1970-2000 for a 
much larger set of countries (in total 14). In this way we contribute to the insight into the 
effect of differential environmental policy on the incentive to innovate, as measured by the 
number of patent applications. 
The common approach of measuring environmental stringency is by using “Pollution 
Abatement and Control Expenditures” (PACE), which reflect pollution abatement capital 
expenditures4 and operating costs. The idea is that an increase in PACE is (partly) due to 
an increase in the environmental policy burden, i.e., firms are expected to spend more on 
pollution abatement when they encounter more strict regulatory measures. However, all 
significant changes in PACE must be reviewed with care, as PACE may also increase 
because of improved sectoral coverage and data availability. Inter-country comparisons 
should therefore be limited to orders of magnitude. Moreover, PACE data are only 
available for a limited set of countries and sectors. Given the broad international 
perspective of our study, PACE is thus an unsuitable candidate for measuring 
environmental stringency. 
Therefore, we had to rely on other measures of environmental stringency, which will 
be discussed in more detail below. In sum, the main finding is that in the theoretically 
preferred model, quite strong innovation incentives exist as environmental policy becomes 
more stringent. The intuition of this model is that high emission levels induce the pursuit 
of a strict environmental policy, which in turn provides a positive incentive to undertake 
innovative activities. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we survey the empirical literature 
on the link between patents and the strictness of environmental regulation. Section 3 
presents a description of the data, for patents as well as for stringency. Moreover, it 
simultaneously discusses the different models. Section 4 presents the results of the 
econometric analyses. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
3 An exception is Popp (2004), who considers the U.S., Germany and Japan. 
4 Pollution abatement capital expenditures include rental and depreciation costs and not the actual amount of 
investment in environmental R&D itself. 
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2 Environmental policy and patents: previous literature 
 
In this section, we briefly review earlier work on environmental patents. The number of 
papers on this issue is rather limited. To the best of our knowledge, we were able to 
identify only 5 papers, which will be discussed chronologically. 
Lanjouw and Mody (1996) were the first to address the issue of increased regulatory 
stringency and environmental patenting empirically. First of all, they show that the 
amount of environmental patents has increased considerably in the period 1971-1988. 
Furthermore, considerable technology transfer has occurred in the form of trade in 
pollution control equipment. Second, they built a patent database, based on a search 
method by means of keywords. We will discuss this way of data acquisition in the next 
section. The data refer to countries (in particular the U.S., Japan and Germany) rather than 
to industries. The analysis of the data leads to conclusions related to the types of pollution 
to which the patent refers. There is evidence, be it non-econometric, that innovations are 
responsive to domestic environmental regulation. Third, attention is also paid to foreign 
patenting in developing countries. It turns out, among other things, that foreign patents in 
developing countries are not particularly tailored to these countries. 
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) distinguish several versions of the Porter hypothesis. The 
“narrow” interpretation reflects that certain types of environmental regulation trigger 
innovation. The “weak” version states that regulation stimulates innovations directed 
towards reducing the cost of regulatory compliance. The “strong” version stresses that 
regulation causes a shock that induces firms to rethink their strategies and bring them 
closer to profit maximizing behavior. In the latter interpretation firms will indeed increase 
profits or reduce costs. Apart from conceptual problems with this “strong” interpretation, 
evidence for it is difficult to find from published data. Therefore, Jaffe and Palmer only try 
to establish a relationship between stringency and innovation. Innovation is measured in 
two ways: industry-wide R&D expenditures (a route we will discuss no further) and 
patents. Patents are considered as proportional to unobserved innovative output. The 












The data refer to a set of U.S. manufacturing industries in the period 1977-1989. The 
variable PATENTS refers to the number of successful patent applications by industry i  in 
year t . Formally, this presupposes that the U.S. Patent Office is able to identify the 
applying firm in terms of industry according to the SIC classification. But this is not the 
case. The Patent Office does, however, classify applications according to certain classes of 
the technological nature of the application and imputes applications to industry groups 
following a “concordance”. We have gone into some detail here because this is relevant 
for our research as well. Jaffe and Palmer note that there are two difficulties with this 
approach. First, it might be the case that inventions made in an industry are not assigned to 
that industry. Second, many inventions relate to new processes that are embodied in 
capital goods. But is the invention then assigned to the capital supplying industry or to the 
capital demanding industry? VALUE ADDED is a size-scaling variable and refers to 
industry value added. As already mentioned above, PACE denotes pollution abatement 
control expenditures. FOREIGN PATENTS denote the successful patent applications 
assigned to a foreign inventor. This variable is included in order to shed light on the 
question whether U.S. firms that are subject to regulation innovate more relative to foreign 
firms. Moreover, patents will vary over time and across industries, possibly due to 
variations in variables that affect the decision to apply for a patent. One may argue that 
these effects can at least partially be captured by assuming that these factors apply to 
foreign firms as well. In addition to a time variable, Jaffe and Palmer also include possible 
fixed effects for industries. 
Jaffe and Palmer find a statistically significant result for FOREIGN PATENTS and 
VALUE ADDED, but the PACE variable is statistically insignificant for all variants of the 
model. A suggestion for future research is to try to obtain more disaggregated data on 
patents, a better classification of patents into industries, and an alternative, more output 
oriented measure of stringency. 
Bhatnagar and Cohen (1998) extend the analysis of Jaffe and Palmer (1997) in 
several respects. Whereas Jaffe and Palmer consider all patents, Bhatnagar and Cohen 
focus on environmentally related patents. To add another element of stringency, they also 
consider the role of environmental monitoring by the government. Moreover, they include 












VALSHIP refers to the value of industry shipments, VISITS to pollution related 
inspections. CONC, CAPINT and EXPINT are measures of industry concentration, capital 
intensity and export intensity respectively. For PACE the authors incorporate pollution 
abatement capital and operating costs. The period covered in Bhatnagar and Cohen’s study 
is 1983-1992 and includes 146 industries. The patent variable refers to successful patent 
applications. The authors are not clear on how “environmental technologies” are 
identified. The allocation of such patents to industries basically suffers from the same 
problems as in Jaffe and Palmer (1997), because the classification was made on the basis 
of the “primary line of business” of the organization of the first named assignee in the 
patent application. Contrary to Jaffe and Palmer, the stringency variable is now highly 
statistically significant. Inspection does not play a major role overall, but it does in the 
chemical and the automobile industry, both of which are given extra attention. 
The previous paper led to a published article by Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003), 
where essentially the same model is employed with a few extensions added. The results of 
the previous paper regarding the significance of the environmental stringency variable 
remain with the introduction of a time dummy. In other versions of the model explicit 
account is taken of the fact that the dependent variable is a positive integer. The 
conclusion with respect to PACE is unaltered. 
Taylor et al. (2003) focus on SO2 control, in particular flue gas desulfurization 
(FGD). Their study is based on the time path of SO2-related patents over 100 years (1887 
till 1995), expert interviews, data from the International Energy Agency, and patent lists 
of the major players in the FGD market. One of the results they obtain is that persistently 
most patents were issued in the period after 1970 when SO2 regulation came in place. 
These regulations are well documented in terms of requirements as contained in 
legislation. Second, capital costs of FGD equipment have decreased considerably, 
arguably the consequence of stricter regulation and possibly an effect in line with Porter’s 
hypothesis.5 
Popp (2004) is a recent and closely related paper. Alike the present study, his main 
focus is on SO2 (together with NOx). While Popp considers the number of patent 
applications in a triple-country setting (U.S., Japan and Germany), we incorporate a 
maximum of 14 countries. Compared to our contribution, there are other major differences 
too, which mainly refer to the way data are gathered (to which we will come back in 
Section 3.1) and to the research question addressed. Popp’s interest is twofold. First, he 
                                                 
5 This optimistic view is not shared in an econometric analysis performed on FGD by Bellas (1998). 
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aims to obtaining a relationship between stringency of domestic environmental regulation 
and patenting. It is found that more stringent regulation in a country indeed enhances 
domestic patenting by domestic inventors, but not by foreign investors. This result is 
obtained by casual inspection of time series rather than by an econometric analysis, as we 
will conduct below. A second and more important objective is to investigate the link 
between domestic and foreign patents. It turns out that domestic innovation mainly occurs 
via domestic firms, in spite of the fact that foreign abatement equipment might have been 
available earlier. But domestic inventors rely strongly on foreign patents in developing 
their new equipment. 
The empirical literature teaches us two lessons. First, there is a need for additional 
and more systematic attempts to empirically test a possible link between environmental 
stringency and innovation. Second, using patents as a proxy for innovative output as a 
consequence of environmental policy requires a quite specific search for relevant patents. 
That is, since innovation in emission control equipment is rather pollutant specific, 
accuracy in the retrieval of patents is extremely important. 
 
 
3 Data description and modeling 
 
In this section we describe the data used for our analysis. We have two types of data: data 
that refer to environment-related patents and those that refer to the stringency of 
environmental policy. We start with patents in subsection 3.1, followed by an examination 




Our main data source has been the European Patent Office (EPO) in The Hague. EPO’s 
database can be accessed in two ways. A first access mode is the online database 
esp@cenet.6 Second, one can consult the EPO directly by contacting experts at the office. 
We followed the latter procedure and we will explain below the advantages of this 
approach. 
The patents are classified according to the European Classification System (ECLA). 
For example, B01D53/50 refers to the class containing patents on the chemical or 
                                                 
6 The online database can be entered via http://www.espacenet.com/. 
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biological processes to reduce SO2. Since our analysis particularly focuses on sulfur 
dioxide, we are only interested in patents aiming at reducing SO2. Furthermore, because 
the international environmental policy agenda with regard to SO2 was basically initiated 
around the 1970s, we restrict our attention to the period 1970-2000. 
EPO’s database can provide patents counted by the so-called priority date, which is 
the earliest year of application. Using priority dates allows us to construct a time series 
that embodies information concerning actual innovative output, i.e., priority dates actually 
give an indication of the time the innovator perceives the invention as potentially valuable. 
This is independent of any differences in application rules set by the different patent 
offices. So priority dates provide uniformity in measuring innovate output and make an 
accurate comparison of innovation across countries possible. 
Following Lanjouw and Mody (1996), Taylor et al. (2003) and Popp (2004), we 
make use of keywords in order to find the appropriate patents. We first construct a base set 
by means of general keywords (step 1) and then impose combined group-related keywords 
(step 2). Step 1 and step 2 yield a preliminary set of potentially relevant patents, which are 
then individually screened on the basis of patent abstracts (step 3). After reading each 
single patent abstract it was determined whether it explicitly relates to SO2 abatement or 
not. If not, the patent was eliminated from the set; it remained in the set otherwise. The 
third step in the patent retrieval procedure is a distinctive feature of our database. The final 
step in the procedure (step 4) implies the search for so-called “family members” of each 
patent in the clean set as obtained through the screening in step 3. Patents are family 
members if they are based upon the same priority, which means that these are patents that 
comprise the same claim. It indicates in how many countries a patent with the same 
priority is applied for. This is particularly relevant because of the multi-country focus of 












Since the focal point of the analysis is SO2, the search in EPO’s database was first 
restricted to the use of the following combination of keywords: SO2 or SOx or +SULFUR+ 
or +SULPHUR+.7 The result is the base set that identifies those patents related to “sulfur”. 
At the date of the first search, the base set contained a total number of 121,913 patents.8 
 
Step 2 
There are many different ways to control or abate SO2 emissions. A technique with a long 
history in SO2 reduction is scrubbing, which is a key-representative of end-of-pipe 
technologies. In addition, next to improvement of existing technologies, R&D can be 
directed towards the development of new technologies. A potentially new technique 
suitable for SO2 reduction – and which is currently still in the experimentation stage – is 
called oxidative desulfurization. Given the large range of technical options, we make use 
of the technological distinctions included in the well-known RAINS model as developed 
at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. The RAINS model 
distinguishes the following SO2 abatement categories (see Cofala and Syri, 1998): 
 
1. The use of low-sulfur fuels, including fuel desulfurization; 
2. In-furnace control of SO2 emissions (e.g., through limestone injection or with 
several types of fluidized bed combustion); 
3. Conventional wet flue gas desulfurization processes; 
4. Advanced, high efficiency methods for capturing sulfur from flue gas; 
5. Measures to control process emissions. 
 
The base set is then used for subsearches based on the aforementioned RAINS 
classification. These are searches based on the group-related keywords as contained in 
Table 1. The first subsearch was based on the use of low-sulfur fuels, including fuel 
desulfurization. The keywords applied for this class are: FUEL, DESULP and DESULF.9 
Subsearch 2 focused on in-furnace control of SO2 emissions by imposing the keywords 
                                                 
7 To be complete in the patent search, we had to be explicit in using the English and American writing style 
and, therefore, had to distinguish between “sulphur” and “sulfur”. Moreover, a “+” put in front of or after a 
keyword implies that when the search engine browses through the database also those words that contain the 
original words are included. For example, “sulfur+” also yields “desulfurization”. 
8 The first search was conducted on September 26, 2003. The search date is important because EPO’s 
database is dynamic in the sense that every day new patents may be included. A new search at another time 
probably yields more patents in the base set. 
9 The “and” term between keywords refers to a combination of keywords in the search, whereas “or” 
statements refer to synonymous expressions of the associated keyword. 
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COMBUST, BURN, INCINER, LIME, LIMESTONE, CA and CALCIUM. Furthermore, 
in subsearch 3 we combined classes 3 and 4 of the RAINS classification by 
simultaneously employing the keywords FLUE and GAS. Note that class number 5 
(measures to control process emissions) is a difficult one and may comprise various 
techniques. Therefore, we did not specify this class in detail. But as already noted above, a 
relatively new way to cut back SO2 emissions is oxidative desulfurization. In subsearch 4 
we emphasized this new process by using the keywords OXIDATIVE and DESUL. 
 
 
Table 1: Used keywords (in caps) and combinations of keywords per search (keywords) 
Subsearch Keywords 
1 FUEL and DESULF+ or DESULP+ 
2 COMBUST or BURN+ or INCINER+ and LIME or LIMESTONE or CA or CALCIUM 
3 FLUE and GAS 




The subsearches mentioned above led to a pool of potentially relevant patents; in total 
4,243. However, in order to obtain a set of adequate data, for each of these potentially 
relevant patents the abstract was carefully read in order to determine whether it is really 
environmentally relevant or not. The total number of rejected patents, including double 
counts, was 1,105 (26%). The adjusted patent yield thus was 3,138 (4,243-1,105). 
 
Step 4 
A final step in the data acquisition procedure required the retrieval of the so-called family 
members of each of the patents in the adjusted set (step 3). Patents are family members if 
they are based upon the same priority. Once an inventor files its patent application for the 
first time (the priority date, i.e., the earliest application date) in a certain country, it has 
some time (maximum one year) to also file its application in other countries. In our case, 





The major difference with the previously mentioned studies is step 3, where each 
individual patent is screened for its environmental relevance. The usual procedure is to 
work with keywords, as we did. But then one looks for those ECLA classes that contain a 
majority of environmentally related patents. In the further analysis it is then assumed that 
all patents in these classes are environment related. This might pose serious problems if 
the composition of patents within a class changes over time, so that for certain years the 
class is relevant, but no longer for other years. Moreover, even if in a certain class 
environmental patents are only a minority, they still may be relevant. Therefore, we think 
that individual inspection of the abstracts is preferable above relying on working with 
entire classes. 
Appendix A contains a complete overview of the data. In total we distinguish 14 
countries: United States, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Finland, Austria, Denmark, 
Sweden, Canada, The Netherlands, Poland, Italy, Luxembourg and Switzerland. Table 2 
summarizes some patent application statistics for each of these countries and accounts for 
patents that are based upon the same priority (family members). 
 
 
Table 2: Patent application statistics for SO2 control technologies per country (1970-2000) 
 Total US DE UK FR FI AT DK SE CA NL PL IT LU CH 
Total 5323 2488 1722 162 161 156 152 139 113 53 44 42 41 30 20 
Mean 171.71 80.26 55.55 5.23 5.19 5.03 4.90 4.48 3.65 1.71 1.42 1.35 1.32 0.97 0.65 
St.dev. 66.55 36.09 36.92 6.87 6.74 11.72 7.61 6.71 6.77 2.15 3.69 2.63 3.22 2.85 2.46 
Min 34 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 296 152 135 26 20 63 27 27 25 8 13 11 12 11 12 
Share 1 .467 .324 .030 .030 .029 .029 .026 .021 .010 .008 .008 .008 .006 .004 
US: United States, DE: Germany, UK: United Kingdom, FR: France, FI: Finland, AT: Austria, DK: Denmark, SE: 
Sweden, CA: Canada, NL: The Netherlands, PL: Poland, IT: Italy, LU: Luxembourg, CH: Switzerland 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the aggregate number of patent applications 
included in our set. From 1970 on, it shows an increase in the number of applications with 
a peak in the mid 1980s. Then the amount of applications exhibits a decreasing tendency. 





















Figure 1: Aggregate patent applications for SO2 control equipment 
 
 
A more differentiated picture is given in Figure 2, which shows the development of 
patenting activity in the four biggest countries in terms of the number of patent 
applications (85.2%)10, viz. the U.S., Germany (DE), United Kingdom (UK), and France 
(FR). If we compare patent activity in the U.S. with that in Germany, we see from Figure 
2 that in both cases patent activity features an irregular pattern, but that the “global” 
pattern is more or less bell shaped for Germany with a clear peak in the mid 1980s. That 
is, in Germany the number of patent applications basically tends to increase from 1970 on, 
reaching its peak around 1985, and then falls down again to a much lower level. If we add 
a linear trend line to the time series of the U.S. and Germany, we derive in both cases a 
positive slope; however, for Germany the slope is somewhat smaller (1.395) than that of 
the U.S. (2.0). 
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Figure 2: Patent activity in the US, Germany (DE), United Kingdom (UK) and France (FR) 
 
 
It is, of course, difficult to derive any conclusions on the relation between 
environmental policy and patenting activity based on a graph like the one depicted in 
Figure 2. At this stage we can only highlight the main developments in environmental 
policy as related to the control of SO2 emissions. As stated before, the general 
encountering of environmental problems occurred in the early 1970s. From that time on 
also the SO2 oriented policy measures developed more extensively. 
Because the online database poses limits on the total number of patents one can 
retrieve11, for our approach it was necessary to cooperate with EPO. An example of the 
major differences in data obtained is the U.S. patents for SO2 reduction. We find a 
significant increase in the number of patent applications in the U.S. in the period 1997-
1999, whereas the number of patent applications in this interval is relatively stable in Popp 
(2004). Another difference in the time series applies to the period 1979-1981. Also here 
the level of U.S. patent applications are relatively stable in Popp (2004), while in our case 
there is a significant decrease in the number of patents in the U.S. Perhaps this difference 
is partly explained by the fact that Popp restricts himself to power plants. However, it is 
unlikely that this accounts for the entire difference, because also in our database power 
plants play an important role. 
 
                                                 
11 The limit is 500 patents. 
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3.2 Environmental stringency 
 
Now we have outlined the innovation part of the problem as measured by the number of 
patent applications, the next issue we have to address is the stringency of environmental 
policy with regard to SO2. A distinction will be made between 3 approaches, leading to six 
different model specifications. In general, all models are linear fixed effects models, 
which in our case implies that the country-specific intercepts (the fixed effects) capture all 
the permanent inter-country variation in innovation. That is, differences in variation in 





In this model we assume that the strictness of environmental policy is captured by 
international agreements, which become more stringent over time. Compliance with these 
agreements by individual signatories requires more stringent domestic policy. From the 
sequence of relevant regulatory designations with respect to sulfur abatement as 
summarized below, one sees that the stringency of emission goals has increased through 
the years: 
 
• 1979: Protocol to the convention on long-range transboundary air pollution. 
• 1985: Helsinki protocol on the reduction of sulphur emissions or their 
transboundary fluxes (entered into force 1987). It entails emission reduction 
obligations for 1994. The reduction target for SO2 emissions is more than 30% 
compared to 1980 levels. 
• 1994: Oslo protocol on further reduction of sulphur emissions (entered into force 
1998). Differentiation of emission reduction obligations (base year 1980 levels). 
• 1999: Gothenburg protocol to abate acidification, eutrophication and ground-level 
ozone (not yet into force). It includes a differentiation of emission reduction 
obligations for 2010. The overall reduction target for SOx emissions in Europe 




The sequence of the protocols highlights the main developments in environmental 
policy as related to the control of SO2 emissions and shows that since the recognition of 
environmental problems in the early 1970s, the subsequent encountering of problems 
associated with SO2 emissions (e.g., acid rain), have resulted in a more stringent pursuit of 
emission targets. In order to capture this development, we consider two modeling variants: 
I-a and I-b. Model I-a reads as follows: 
 
.DDDTRENDPATENTS itiit ε+β+β+β+β+α= 948579 3210  (1) 
 
The dependent variable (PATENTS) refers to the number of patent applications in country 
i in year t. On the RHS of (1) we include fixed country effects iα  and a general trend 
variable (TREND). Additionally, we have dummies for the years 1979 (D79), 1985 (D85) 
and 1994 (D94).12 Coefficients 321 ,, βββ  capture the increased perceived stringency as a 
consequence of the protocol to the convention on long-range transboundary air pollution, 
the Helsinki protocol, and the Oslo protocol respectively. itε  is a random disturbance 
term. 
In order to elucidate the anticipatory effects to future policy implementations, in the 
estimations we have also looked at several alternative modeling versions with a lag 
structure applied to the dummies. The results are provided and discussed in the next 
section. 
Compared to version I-a, model I-b does not include dummies for the exact date of 
the protocol. Instead, the dummies in I-b capture the intermediate range (time interval) 
between two different protocols in order to capture the effect of environmental stringency 
as imposed in individual countries after the signing of the international agreements. More 
specifically, 
 
,DDDDPATENTS itiit ε+β+β+β+β+α= 9400859379847178 4321  (2) 
 
where D7178 is a dummy with value 1 for the years 1971-1978 and value 0 otherwise. 
The same routine applies to D7984, D8593 and D9400. Since these dummies basically 
cover the whole period under consideration, we do not include a general time trend since 
that would introduce redundancy in terms of time variables. Again, itε  is a random 
disturbance term. Models I-a and I-b differ from Jaffe and Palmer (1997) and 
                                                 
12 Because our data goes until 2000, we did not include a dummy for the 1999 Gothenburg protocol. 
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Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) in the sense that their models include time dummies for 
all years in order to remove the effects from time-dependent determinants of innovation 





In the second model (model II) we assume that stringency differentials between countries 
are constant over time. This approach is based on recent work by Cagatay and Mihci 
(2003), who develop an “Index of Environmental Sensitivity Performance” (IESP). The 
IESP consists of several subindices, among which an index referring to acidification. 
Their analysis is based on the pressure-state-response indicator developed by Hammond et 
al. (1995) and which is used by the OECD. The pressure indicators for acidification are 
SOx and NOx emissions. The state indicators are emissions of these gases per unit of real 
GDP from several sources – including power stations – and industrial and domestic fuel 
combustion. The response indicator is the share of pollution abatement and control 
expenditures aiming at the reduction of pollution.13 We adopt the IESP to test whether in a 
country that can be characterized as “stringent”, relatively more patents (appropriately 
scaled) are applied for. 
The basic econometric specification of model II is as follows: 
 
ititititiit RDPERSSDSTRICTNESGDPTRENDPATENTS ε+β+β+β+β+α= 3210 , (3) 
 
where TREND is again a general trend variable, GDP represents gross domestic product 
and acts as a scaling variable, and RDPERS refers to the number of people active in R&D. 
The variable DSTRICTNESS is a dummy indicating a country’s environmental policy 
strictness with respect to SO2 emissions, which is based upon the corresponding IESP for 
acidification. DSTRICTNESS takes value 1 if a country is classified as “strict” or is 0 
otherwise. This dummy thus determines the marginal value of a strict environmental 
policy regime with respect to patent activity. 
Cagatay and Mihci calculate an IESP for acidification, among others (climate 
change, waste management, water resource usage). Their acidification IESP was 
calculated on the interval 1990-1995. Unfortunately, this rather limited time span posed 
                                                 
13 So expenditures on natural parks and the supply of drinking water are not included. 
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some restrictions on exploiting the potential econometric information included in our 
extensive time series (1970-2000). Due to this limitation we estimated (3) for the period 
1990-2000. 
The corresponding IESP levels in Cagatay and Mihci (2003) were categorized in 
different stringency regimes ranging from the extremes “strict” to “tolerant”. More 
precisely, they distinguish six categories: strict, strict to moderate, moderate to strict, 
moderate, moderate to tolerant, and tolerant. In total 23 countries were included in their 
analysis and each country was put into one of the categories based on the corresponding 
IESP score. If we had adopted their categorization directly, in our set of countries only 
Austria would fall into the “strict” group. However, since the value of the acidification 
IESP for Austria is also a “borderline” case according to their categorical confinement, it 
could as well be classified as “strict to moderate”. This would then imply than no country 
from our set could be classified as purely “strict”. In turn, little variation within categories 
exists. In order to secure variation for the purpose of our study, we therefore redesigned 
Cagatay and Mihci’s classification by defining only two classes: “strict” and “tolerant”. 
Country i is classified as “strict” if 50.1 < IESPi  100, whereas it is “tolerant” if 0 < IESPi 
 50.0. Table 3 shows the values of the IESP acidification for the various countries and 
the corresponding classification within our modeling framework. 
 
 
Table 3: Acidification IESP for different countries and corresponding classification based on 
own classification 
Country IESP Classification 
United States 50.00 tolerant 
United Kingdom 41.67 tolerant 
Canada 25.00 tolerant 
France 75.00 strict 
Italy 58.33 strict 
Germany 66.67 strict 
Poland 25.00 tolerant 
The Netherlands 83.33 strict 
Sweden 75.00 strict 
Finland 58.33 strict 
Austria 83.33 strict 
Denmark 50.00 tolerant 
Switzerland 75.00 strict 
   Source: Cagatay and Mihci (2003), Table B8, p. 240 
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The borderline value of 50.1 is the value that corresponds to Cagatay and Mihci’s 
classification. So, formally speaking, according to our binary classification (1 for strict 
and 0 for tolerant), countries with an IESP level of 50 (in our case the U.S. and Denmark) 
should be classified as “tolerant”. But because the difference is only 0.1 at the margin, at 
the same it could as easily be put in the group “strict”. Thus, the caveat of model II lies in 
defining the arbitrary swap value of going from “strict” to “tolerant”. Therefore, various 
econometric analyses were conducted on classifying the “IESP borderline countries” U.S. 
and Denmark. In model II-a, the U.S. and Denmark were classified as “strict”, whereas in 
II-b they were treated as being “tolerant”. In the final case (model II-c), the U.S. and 





In the preceding models we implicitly assumed that environmental stringency was, to 
some extent, directly observable by international environmental protocols and an 
environmental sensitivity performance index. However, both measures of environmental 
stringency are imperfect; they only provide a limited view on environmental stringency. 
Therefore, in the current model we take for granted that the strictness of environmental 
policy is not directly observable, a priori. That is, environmental stringency is a latent 
variable.14 
Xing and Kolstad (2002) study the effect of environmental policy strictness on 
foreign direct investment and also face the latency problem of environmental strictness. 
Their analysis concerns sulfur emissions and the methodology they use for revealing 
environmental strictness can be applied to our model as well. In our case, the model would 
look as follows: 
 
,),( itititiit STRICTNESSZfPATENTS ε+=  (4a) 
 
,),( itititiit STRICTNESSXgEMIS η+=  (4b) 
 
where patents (PATENTS) in country i at time t are a function of a vector of exogenous 
variables Z and of the unobserved environmental policy strictness (STRICTNESS). Sulfur 
                                                 
14 See e.g., Zellner (1970) and Goldberger (1972) for more general details about estimating equations with 
unobserved and observed variables. 
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dioxide emissions (EMIS) depend on another vector of exogenous variables X and on 
strictness as well. Assuming that the function gi is invertible in the degree of 
environmental stringency, i.e., ),,(1 ititiit EMISXgSTRICTNESS
−=  one obtains: 
 
ititititiit )EMIS,Z,X(hPATENTS ξ+= , (5) 
 
which is the equation to be estimated. Note that estimating (5) by OLS yields biased 
results because the error term itξ  is correlated with STRICTNESS. We will come back to 
this below. 
More specifically, assume that the economy-wide SO2 emissions depend on 
aggregate output measured in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and on the industrial 
structure, which we model via value added (VALADD). In our case, VALADD is the value 
added contributed by 13 different sectors relative to the total value added of all industries. 
The included sectors are:15 Food products, beverages and tobacco (15-16); Wood and 
products of wood and cork (20); Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing (21-
22); Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products (23-25); Other non-metallic mineral 
products (26); Basic metals and fabricated metal products (27-28); Machinery and 
equipment (29-33); Transport equipment (34-35); Manufacturing nec recycling (36-37); 
Electricity, gas and water supply (40-41); Construction (45); Transport and storage (60-
63); Energy producing activities. Consequently, equation (4b) becomes: 
 
).STRICTNESS,VALADD,GDP(gEMIS itititiit =  (6) 
 
Given the invertibility of gi we get: 
 
)EMIS,VALADD,GDP(hSTRICTNESS itititiit = . (7) 
 
So environmental strictness is contingent on gross domestic product, the industry structure 





                                                 
15 The ISIC codes of the included sectors are in parentheses. 
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In the line of (5), the specific equation to be estimated now reads: 
 
itititititiit RDPERSEMISVALADDGDPPATENTS ξ+β+β+β+β+α= 4321 , (8) 
 
where the composite error term itξ  is uncorrelated with any of the RHS variables in (8) 
and has zero mean. Furthermore, the variances of this error term will vary across 
countries. These observations call for an instrumental variable approach. Following Xing 
and Kolstad (2002), we include as instruments all the exogenous variables and population 
density. The latter could serve as an indicator of congestion and the ability of pollutants to 
naturally disperse away from population centers (Xing and Kolstad, 2002, p. 11). 
The intuitive relationship between environmental stringency and emissions is that if 
a country has a relatively high level of SO2 emissions, environmental stringency in that 
country will be relatively more intense. As a consequence, we would expect the number of 
patent applications to be positively related with SO2 emissions. The role of national 
income is ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher national income will lead to more 
emissions. On the other hand, environmental policy may also be negatively related to 




4 Empirical results 
 
The description of the empirical results follows the order of the models as discussed 
above. All models are are estimated by means of a pooled least-squares method with 
White  heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. 
 
4.1 Results model I 
 
Table 4 presents the results of model I-a and I-b. In both models the time trend is highly 
significant. In model I-a the dummies are all statistically insignificant. Furthermore, in 
both I-a and I-b the fixed effects show considerable variation over the distinguished 
countries. The U.S. and Germany have relatively high fixed effects compared to the other 
countries. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) use GDP as a scaling variable. Next to calculations 
                                                 
16 See e.g., Copeland and Taylor (2003) for a discussion on endogenous environmental policy. 
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with real GDP, we also conducted analyses with a general trend variable; however, both 
variables generated the same positive effect and did not affect the dummy variables 
significantly. In other words, GDP and the trend variable essentially provide the same 
statistical results. 
Instead of using real GDP as a scaling variable, we also conducted econometric 
analyses by using a scale variable measured in terms of the number of personnel that is 
involved in the R&D processes of different countries. When it comes to patents 
(innovation), such a scaling variable may be even more appropriate since it proxies the 
size of the R&D sector (by the number of researchers and technicians) as well as a 
countries’ technically oriented educational basis, i.e., the intellectual assets in terms of 
highly qualified personnel (researchers and technicians). For this variable we only found 
data from 1980 onwards. We did some econometric analyses with this, but found that the 
inclusion of highly trained workers does not increase the significance of the dummy 
variables. On the other hand, as expected, it reduces the differences in fixed effects. 
Note that Germany has high fixed effects relative to the U.S., i.e., the difference in 
fixed effects is relatively small between these two countries if you consider the U.S. 
“large” compared to Germany. However, compared to the U.S., in Germany a relatively 
high number of people are working in R&D. This could explain (partially) the relatively 
small difference in fixed effects. Moreover, in addition to the number of R&D personnel, 
another reason of Germany’s high fixed effect could be due to its relatively stringent 
policy regime. In case of the 1994 Oslo protocol, which allowed for differentiated 
emission reduction targets, Germany pursued the most stringent emission goals of all 
countries, namely reduction targets of 83% (87%) of 1980 SOx emissions by the year 2000 
(2005). With respect to the 2000 targets, the other countries’ reduction goals range from 











Table 4: Effects of environmental protocols on patent applications: model I-a and I-b 
Variable Coefficients Model I-a Coefficients Model I-b 
TREND 0.266 (3.845) - 
D79 3.700 (1.413) - 
D85 8.321 (1.211) - 
D94 3.931 (0.753) - 
   
D7178 - 5.330 (1.114) 
D7984 - 11.048 (2.231) 
D8593 - 13.254 (2.729) 
D9400 - 10.959 (2.275) 
   
Fixed effects   
United States 75.760 70.422 
Germany 51.051 45.712 
United Kingdom 0.728 -4.611 
France 0.696 -4.643 
Austria 0.406 -4.933 
Finland 0.535 -4.804 
Sweden -0.852 -6.191 
Denmark -0.014 -5.352 
Canada -2.788 -8.127 
Italy -3.175 -8.513 
Poland -3.143 -8.482 
The Netherlands -3.078 -8.417 
Luxembourg -3.530 -8.869 
Switzerland -3.852 -9.191 
   
R2 0.728 0.733 
Adjusted R2 0.717 0.722 
Log likelihood -1770.98 -1767.20 
Mean patents 12.265 12.265 
 NB: t-statistic in parentheses 
 
 
The statistical insignificance of the dummy variables in model I-a comes as no 
surprise. The dummies refer to the establishment of important international treaties on 
SO2. It is, however, difficult to argue that these treaties have had an instantaneous effect 
on the number of patent applications. Alternative arguments are that the international 
agreements lead to more stringent policies in the individual countries that come into effect 
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much later than the signing of the treaties. In contrast, one could also argue that firms 
anticipate to more stringent policies long before the actual international agreements are 
implemented. In order to test for the first possibility, which sounds rather plausible, we 
have introduced dummies for periods (model I-b) rather than for specific years when 
international agreements occurred (model I-a). Concurrently, for reasons of comparison, 
we also conducted several calculations with different lag specifications of the dummies in 
model I-a. In general, we found for a one, two, three and four period lag structure no 
statistically significant results for the dummies D79, D85 and D94. 
With the exception of dummy D7178, in model I-b all dummies are highly 
significant and have the expected positive sign. Obviously, based on this model 
specification we cannot conclude that international environmental agreements enhance 
innovation, even though at first sight the Helsinki Protocol seems to have triggered more 
innovation than the other protocols. Unfortunately this cannot be concluded; based on a 
Wald test we could not reject the null-hypothesis 432 βββ == , i.e., there are no 
significant differences between the dummies D7984, D8593 and D9400. On the other 
hand, when including D7178, the null-hypothesis 4321 ββββ ===  is rejected, implying 
that dummy D7178 has a significantly smaller effect on patenting activity than dummies 
D7984, D8593 and D9400. Based on these results we might conclude that innovation in 
terms of patent applications has increased significantly since the 1979 Protocol to the 
convention on long-range transboundary air pollution. 
Based on the above results one can hypothesize that countries are willing to sign 
protocols if they can achieve the environmental targets relatively easily, that is, with little 
effort and with little investment in R&D. For instance, when we take a closer look at the 
1985 Helsinki protocol, where the countries agreed upon a reduction of SO2 emissions by 
at least 30 percent, only Canada, France and Luxembourg did not meet their national 
targets by 1993.17 The 1994 Oslo protocol subscribes the hypothesis even better; with the 
exception of the U.S. who did not ratify the protocol, all countries in the sample did meet 
their targets quite easily before the target year 2000, ranging from 1989 (Switzerland) to 





                                                 
17 Canada, France and Luxembourg met the Helsinki targets in 1999, 1994 and 1995 respectively. In our 
sample only Poland and the United Kingdom did not ratify the Helsinki protocol. 
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4.2 Results model II 
 
The findings for model II and its different versions are displayed in Table 5. Recall that 
version II-a (II-b) classifies the U.S. and Denmark as “strict” (“tolerant”). In II-c they 
were both excluded. Taking a look at the impact of environmental stringency on the 
number of patent applications, we see that the sign of the estimated coefficients are 
invariant of whether environmental policy in the U.S. (and Denmark) is characterized as 
strict or tolerant. DSTRICTNESS has a negative effect in model II-a as well as II-b, though 
it is not significant. Thus in all cases the marginal value of a strict environmental policy is 
insignificant. However, when the sample is adjusted for “borderline countries” (II-c), the 
marginal value is positive and comes close to statistical significance, implying that the 
pursuit of a more stringent environmental policy likely enhances innovative activities. 
Further, the effect of GDP on innovation is in all three cases very small and 
statistically insignificant. Also the size of the R&D population (RDPERS) has in all three 
versions a small effect on patent output. However, the effect is significant and, as 
expected, positive. In other words, when more people get involved in the R&D sector (a 
higher aggregate level of R&D effort), the more likely it is that patent activity increases. 
Finally, the TREND is negatively related to innovation and is significant. 
 
 
Table 5: Effects of environmental stringency on patent applications: model II 
Variable Model II-a Model II-b Model II-c 
TREND -0.211 (-3.360) -0.189 (-3.002) -0.187 (-3.076) 
GDP 0.0056 (1.075) 0.0055 (1.151) -0.0078 (-1.771) 
DSTRICTNESS -0.563 (-0.283) -1.453 (-0.730) 1.866 (1.072) 
RDPERS 0.062 (2.506) 0.063 (2.641) 0.107 (4.964) 
    
R2 0.712 0.713 0.603 
Adjusted R2 0.702 0.703 0.588 
Mean patents 8.885 8.885 7.733 







4.3 Results model III 
 
Table 6 contains the estimation results of equation (8) based on the instrumental variable 
estimation procedure in order to obtain consistent, unbiased and efficient estimates. 
Variables can serve as instrument only if they are correlated with the unobservable 
variable of environmental strictness (STRICTNESS), but at the same time are uncorrelated 
with the disturbance term itξ . Therefore, as commonly applied in the literature, we 
incorporated the exogenous variables GDP, VALADD, and RDPERS. Note that EMIS 
cannot serve as an instrument due to the endogeneity of SO2 emissions. Concurrently, also 
per capita GDP and population density acted as instruments, which are also unlikely to be 
correlated with itξ . 
Because we did not find any adequate time series data on RDPERS en VALADD 
prior to 1980, we estimated model III for the period 1980-2000. From table 6 we see that 
GDP, VALADD and EMIS have a significant positive effect on patent applications. 
Environmental stringency, as measured through EMIS, has a strong significant effect on 
innovation, i.e., the number of patent applications. When emissions go up, hence inducing 
a more stringent environmental policy, innovation tends to be stimulated. Further, alike 
GDP, the industry structure as measured by VALADD also has a positive impact on 
patenting. 
Regarding the number of personnel involved in the R&D process (RDPERS), one 
would expect it to be positively related with innovation. That is, if the size of the R&D 
population increases, more effort is put into the overall R&D activities and therefore also 
more patent output could be expected. From table 6 we see that the data indeed reveals a 
positive relationship between innovation and RDPERS, though the effect is statistically 












Table 6: Effects of environmental stringency on patent applications: model III 
Variable Coefficient 
GDP 0.014 (2.531) 
VALADD 0.687 (2.911) 
EMIS 8.528 (5.993) 
RDPERS 0.068 (1.311) 
  
Fixed effects  
United States -240.986 


















The primary purpose of the present paper was to investigate the relationship between 
stringency of environmental policy regarding sulfur dioxide (SO2) and innovativeness at 
the country level over the period 1970-2000. We have considered several ways of 
measuring environmental policy strictness. The incentive to innovate was measured by 
means of patent applications. As was to be expected, due to the lack of adequate time 
series regarding pollution abatement control expenditures for the set of countries under 
consideration, finding plausible measures of stringency posed a major problem. For that 
reason we had to rely on approaches that are not entirely satisfactory. The first approach is 
rather naïve in making no distinction between countries. It relies on the assumption that 
major international agreements on SO2 reductions provide incentives for innovations. The 
analysis suggests that innovation has increased since the start of the 1979 Protocol to the 
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convention on long range transboundary air pollution. In a second model we classify 
countries as strict or tolerant over the period 1990-2000, thereby not allowing for 
increased or decreased stringency over time at the country level in this specific period. 
Several cases were analyzed, since the bimodal classification of countries in strict and 
tolerant is not straightforward. However, innovation could not be shown to have a 
significant relationship with stringency. Finally, we relied on an indirect approach 
advocated by Xing and Kolstad (2002). In this setting we find quite a strong positive 
relationship, through emissions. Here the underlying idea is that high emission levels 
trigger strict environmental policy, which in turn provide an incentive for innovation. 
The overall conclusion one is tempted to draw is that, at least in the theoretically 
preferred model, there is a case for what we would like to call the weak version of the 
Porter hypothesis. This means that it has not been established that strict environmental 
policy creates win-win situations, because this is not really measured by innovation. But 
there is an indication that strict environmental policy with regard to SO2 induces new 
abatement technologies. 
The merits of our approach mainly concern the meticulous identification of patents 
that contribute to solving the sulfur dioxide problem. In this process we have benefited 
from the database of the European Patent Office, to which we had direct access. This is 
important because it seems that working with their public database esp@cenet has a 
number of drawbacks which might lead to flawed results, since not all relevant patents can 
be found. 
Future research will concentrate on other pollutants such as carbon dioxide (CO2), 
nitrogen oxide (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). In that research we employ 
the same methodology with respect to the screening of patents, since we think that this 
innovative feature is worthwhile pursuing further. 
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Appendix A: Data 
 
Table A1: Patent applications for sulfur abatement technology per year per country 
Year Total US DE UK FR FI AT DK SE CA NL PL IT LU CH 
1970 34 32  1      1      
1971 144 114 20 5 1     4      
1972 117 78 23 2 11     3      
1973 117 83 15 1     10  8     
1974 100 58 16 8 8     1 2   7  
1975 114 44 29 2 1 8    5 13    12 
1976 49 26 11 8  1    3      
1977 104 46 44 6    7  1      
1978 124 65 23     27  2     7 
1979 194 114 58 7  7  7  1      
1980 102 51 37 2    7  4  1    
1981 131 23 56 6 20  13 13        
1982 219 57 108 12 1  17 9 7 8      
1983 230 72 96 26 5  27 1  3      
1984 256 47 135 6 18 13 5 1 20 1    10  
1985 281 41 122  1 63 25 16 5 7    1  
1986 269 122 104 1   3 17 10 1    11  
1987 296 128 124 3  6 17 6 10 1    1  
1988 217 62 107  8 13 8 3  1  5 9  1 
1989 173 56 84   17 7     8 1   
1990 161 82 39  19 7 12 1    1    
1991 151 99 30 14  1 3 2     2   
1992 196 125 34 24  1      1 11   
1993 232 108 65 17 6 5   25 2  1 3   
1994 253 152 50 2 11  8  19   11    
1995 196 117 66  2  3  4   2 2   
1996 149 74 37 6 14  2     4 12   
1997 119 52 38 3 3 6   3  13  1   
1998 177 98 57  2 7     8 5    
1999 211 135 49  12 1  13    1    
2000 207 127 45  18  2 9  4  2    
Total 5323 2488 1722 162 161 156 152 139 113 53 44 42 41 30 20 
 US: United States, DE: Germany, UK: United Kingdom, FR: France, FI: Finland, AT: Austria, DK: 
Denmark, SE: Sweden, CA: Canada, NL: Netherlands, PL: Poland, IT: Italy, LU: Luxembourg, CH: 
Switzerland 
NB: An open entry implies zero patent applications 
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Table A2: SOx emissions per year per country (1000 tonnes) 
Year US DE UK FR FI AT DK SE CA NL PL IT LU CH 
1970 29006 7368 5810 2819 460 355 292 357 4279 590 2659 4137 7 135 
1971 27633 7296 6023 2744 420 347 243 350 4465 533 2799 4005 12 121 
1972 28288 7100 5149 2696 405 365 227 324 4661 547 2928 3913 15 104 
1973 29558 7143 5455 2858 419 372 249 323 4856 575 3031 4122 15 130 
1974 27955 7117 4949 3028 473 383 277 367 4898 561 3097 4265 30 143 
1975 26074 6891 5272 2690 472 352 270 381 4746 479 3407 3517 27 101 
1976 26468 7009 4994 2786 444 349 255 427 4520 507 3583 3447 31 85 
1977 26643 6964 4797 2937 535 336 304 438 4829 511 3775 3794 26 97 
1978 25018 6748 4704 2802 496 342 309 447 4228 456 3908 3636 23 86 
1979 25078 7238 4661 3118 556 371 376 476 4490 506 4047 3928 18 103 
1980 23501 7514 4880 3208 584 344 452 508 4643 495 4100 3760 24 116 
1981 22600 7441 4431 2588 534 304 364 422 4291 468 4152 3330 20 108 
1982 21400 7440 4208 2490 484 289 368 362 3612 394 4193 2850 16 100 
1983 20800 7346 3861 2095 372 217 312 303 3625 319 4233 2460 14 92 
1984 21500 7633 3719 1867 368 201 296 287 3955 302 4273 2240 14 84 
1985 21463 7732 3750 1473 382 183 339 266 3704 254 4300 1963 16 76 
1986 20700 7641 3895 1348 331 163 278 263 3419 273 4200 2074 14 68 
1987 20400 7397 3898 1288 328 141 249 241 3800 267 4200 2010 14 62 
1988 20700 6487 3818 1223 302 105 242 213 3874 259 4180 2006 12 56 
1989 21215 6165 3699 1272 242 94 193 174 3401 218 3910 1850 12 49 
1990 21481 5322 3754 1269 260 79 181 136 3305 202 3210 1719 15 42 
1991 20906 3995 3568 1379 194 72 239 116 3316 172 3156 1606 13 41 
1992 20696 3307 3447 1201 141 59 186 104 3167 172 2820 1501 13 38 
1993 20388 2945 3105 1040 122 58 152 94 3035 163 2725 1368 15 33 
1994 19845 2472 2665 985 115 52 157 96 2668 146 2605 1320 13 31 
1995 17407 1939 2348 926 97 52 149 90 2806 142 2376 1262 9 34 
1996 17109 1340 2010 905 105 51 179 96 2721 132 2368 1205 8 30 
1997 17566 1039 1637 764 99 46 110 88 2691 118 2181 1075 6 26 
1998 17682 835 1567 837 89 43 75 83 2627 107 1897 1039 4 28 
1999 17116 738 1230 735 85 39 55 71 2597 100 1719 923 4 26 
2000 15176 638 1190 659 76 38 28 58 1254 91 1511 758 3 19 
 
Sources and calculation information: 
- OECD Environmental Data Compendium 1992, 2002 
- Italic numbers: Expert emissions (EMEP) from the Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the 
Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe 
- Boldface numbers: Own estimates based on average (1980-2000) country-specific sulfur emission ratios 
Next to a few missing entries for some countries, direct sulfur dioxide emissions prior to 1980 were also not 
available. We solved this by using sulfur emissions (see Table A3), which were obtained from David Stern’s 
website (http://www.rpi.edu/~sternd/datasite.html). The procedure is as follows. Sulfur emissions data from 
David Stern go back until 1970. For each country in the set, these sulfur emissions were obtained for the 
period 1970-2000. Since we had sulfur dioxide emissions for each country in the period 1980-2000 (with the 
few exceptions), a sulfur ratio (sulfur emissions/SOx emissions) was calculated for each single year and each 
country (see Table A4). Then averaging sulfur ratios over 1980-2000 yields country-specific sulfur ratios.  
Subsequently, the estimated sulfur dioxide emissions for country i at time t were estimated by multiplying the 
country-specific sulfur ratio with the sulfur emissions of country i at time t. 





Table A3: Sulfur emissions per year per country (1000 tonnes) 
Year US DE UK FR FI AT DK SE CA NL PL IT LU CH 
1970 14158 3748 2905 1454 230 178 147 164 2083 295 1325 2035 4,0 67,5 
1971 13488 3711 3012 1415 210 174 123 161 2173 266 1395 1970 7,2 60,7 
1972 13808 3612 2575 1390 203 183 114 149 2269 273 1459 1925 8,9 51,9 
1973 14428 3633 2728 1474 210 186 125 148 2364 287 1511 2028 8,8 64,8 
1974 13645 3620 2475 1562 236 191 139 169 2384 280 1544 2098 17,5 71,5 
1975 12727 3505 2636 1387 236 176 136 175 2310 239 1699 1731 15,5 50,3 
1976 12920 3565 2497 1437 222 175 129 196 2200 253 1786 1696 17,8 42,6 
1977 13005 3542 2399 1515 268 168 153 201 2351 255 1882 1867 15,0 48,5 
1978 12212 3433 2352 1445 248 171 156 205 2058 228 1948 1789 13,5 43,2 
1979 12241 3682 2331 1608 278 186 190 219 2186 253 2018 1933 10,6 51,4 
1980 11770 3757 2427 1631 292 172 226 246 2322 245 2050 1879 12,0 58,0 
1981 11086 3721 2199 1282 267 152 185 216 2146 232 2070 1665 11,6 54,0 
1982 10408 3720 2093 1229 242 144 189 186 1806 202 2090 1425 11,1 50,0 
1983 10141 3673 1923 1012 186 108 161 153 1813 162 2110 1232 10,7 46,0 
1984 10664 3817 1849 903 184 100 153 148 1978 150 2130 1057 10,2 42,0 
1985 10582 3866 1859 754 191 91 170 133 1886 129 2150 951 9,8 38,0 
1986 10114 3821 1939 689 166 81 144 136 1665 132 2100 965 9,3 34,0 
1987 9983 3698 1937 681 164 71 128 114 1844 132 2100 1015 8,9 31,0 
1988 10260 3244 1905 628 151 53 125 112 1886 125 2090 982 8,4 28,0 
1989 10355 3083 1848 710 122 47 98 80 1656 102 1955 927 8,0 24,5 
1990 10477 2661 1860 662 130 39 90 53 1605 101 1605 826 7,5 21,0 
1991 10158 1998 1767 720 97 36 119 50 1788 87 1498 770 7,5 20,5 
1992 10025 1654 1730 638 71 30 93 44 1547 86 1410 697 7,5 19,0 
1993 9884 1473 1557 555 62 29 76 39 1278 82 1363 667 7,5 17,0 
1994 9691 1237 1338 528 57 26 78 40 1246 73 1303 636 6,5 15,5 
1995 8453 997 1182 496 48 26 74 36 1317 74 1188 661 4,5 17,0 
1996 8348 703 1015 484 53 26 90 48 1267 68 1184 603 4,0 15,0 
1997 8554 564 835 410 50 23 55 35 1269 59 1091 538 3,0 13,0 
1998 8602 450 804 423 45 21 37 34 1279 54 949 520 2,0 13,8 
1999 8014 416 614 362 44 19 27 27 1264 52 860 462 1,9 12,8 
2000 7408 319 594 327 37 19 14 29 611 46 756 379 1,5 9,6 
Source: David Stern, Sulfur emissions data, available at http://www.rpi.edu/~sternd/datasite.html 
 
 
Table A4: Sulfur emission ratios per year per country (sulfur emissions/SOx emissions) 
Year US DE UK FR FI AT DK SE CA NL PL IT LU CH 
1980 0,501 0,500 0,497 0,508 0,500 0,499 0,500 0,483 0,500 0,495 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 
1981 0,491 0,500 0,496 0,495 0,500 0,499 0,509 0,511 0,500 0,496  0,500 0,578 0,500 
1982 0,486 0,500 0,497 0,494 0,500 0,499 0,515 0,512 0,500 0,513  0,500 0,694 0,500 
1983 0,488 0,500 0,498 0,483 0,500 0,500 0,517 0,503 0,500 0,506  0,501 0,761 0,500 
1984 0,496 0,500 0,497 0,484 0,500 0,500 0,516 0,516 0,500 0,495  0,472 0,729 0,500 
1985 0,493 0,500 0,496 0,512 0,500 0,500 0,501 0,500 0,509 0,508 0,500 0,484 0,609 0,500 
1986 0,489 0,500 0,498 0,511 0,500 0,500 0,518 0,517  0,484 0,500 0,465 0,664 0,500 
1987 0,489 0,500 0,497 0,528 0,500 0,501 0,512 0,473 0,485 0,493 0,500 0,505 0,632 0,500 
1988 0,496 0,500 0,499 0,513 0,500 0,502 0,517 0,526  0,483 0,500 0,489 0,700 0,500 
1989  0,500 0,500 0,558 0,504 0,500 0,510 0,460  0,468 0,500 0,501 0,663 0,500 
1990 0,488 0,500 0,495 0,521 0,500 0,500 0,497 0,389 0,486 0,500 0,500 0,480 0,500 0,500 
1991 0,486 0,500 0,495 0,522 0,500 0,500 0,499 0,428 0,539 0,503 0,474 0,479  0,500 
1992 0,484 0,500 0,502 0,531 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,422 0,488 0,500 0,500 0,464  0,500 
1993 0,485 0,500 0,502 0,534 0,504 0,500 0,500 0,417 0,421 0,503 0,500 0,487 0,500 0,515 
1994 0,488 0,500 0,502 0,536 0,496 0,500 0,497 0,417 0,467 0,500 0,500 0,481 0,500 0,500 
1995 0,486 0,514 0,504 0,536 0,495 0,500 0,498 0,405 0,469 0,518 0,500 0,524 0,500 0,500 
1996 0,488 0,524 0,505 0,535 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,503 0,466 0,511 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 
1997 0,487 0,542 0,510 0,537 0,500 0,500 0,497 0,396 0,472 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 
1998 0,486 0,538 0,513 0,506 0,506 0,500 0,496 0,406  0,505 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,493 
1999 0,468 0,563 0,500 0,492 0,512 0,500 0,491 0,383  0,516 0,500 0,500 0,478 0,490 
2000  0,500 0,499 0,496 0,483 0,501 0,495 0,493  0,503 0,500 0,500 0,515 0,507 
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